Skip to Main content Skip to Navigation
Conference papers

Bank capital regulation: A role for a supranational regulator ?

Abstract : Using a simple two-country model where national or supranational regulators can set capital requirements as either risk sensitive capital or leverage ratios, we examine which of these arrangements is best. Our results demonstrate the importance of capital requirements being set at a supranational level particularly when crosscountry spillovers are large and national regulators suffer from substantial degrees of regulatory capture. We further highlight the importance of allowing for supervisory "remoteness" in this context, and show that national regulators may want to surrender regulatory power only when spillover effects are large but the degree of supervisory capture is relatively small.
Document type :
Conference papers
Complete list of metadata

Cited literature [5 references]  Display  Hide  Download
Contributor : Anne PERRIN BONRAISIN Connect in order to contact the contributor
Submitted on : Wednesday, January 15, 2020 - 11:36:46 AM
Last modification on : Tuesday, February 22, 2022 - 9:00:02 AM
Long-term archiving on: : Thursday, April 16, 2020 - 2:18:25 PM


Files produced by the author(s)


  • HAL Id : hal-02440576, version 1



Carole Haritchabalet, Laetitia Lepetit, Kévin Spinassou, Frank Strobel. Bank capital regulation: A role for a supranational regulator ?. 32nd International Symposium on Money, Banking and Finance, Jun 2015, Nice, France. ⟨hal-02440576⟩



Record views


Files downloads