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Bank capital regulation: a role for a supranational regulator?

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Abstract

Using a simple two-country model where national or supranational regulators can set capital requirements as either risk sensitive capital or leverage ratios, we examine which of these arrangements is best. Our results demonstrate the importance of capital requirements being set at a supranational level particularly when cross-country spillovers are large and national regulators su¤er from substantial degrees of regulatory capture. We further highlight the im-portance of llowing for supervisory "remoteness" in this context, and show that national regulators may want to surrender regulatory power only when spillover e¤ects are large but the degree of supervisory capture is relatively small.
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Dates and versions

hal-02440145 , version 1 (15-01-2020)

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  • HAL Id : hal-02440145 , version 1

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Carole Haritchabalet, Laetitia Lepetit, Kévin Spinassou, Frank Strobel. Bank capital regulation: a role for a supranational regulator?. 64th Annual Meeting of the French Economic Association, AFSE, Jun 2015, Rennes, France. ⟨hal-02440145⟩
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