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Conference papers
Insurance Pools for New Undiversifiable Risk
Abstract : The European insurance industry benefits from some special antitrust exemptions. Indeed, insurers can syndicate, via a "pool", for the coverage of undiversifiable risks. We show that the pool issue amounts to share a common value divisible good between capacity constrained agents with a reserve price and private information. We characterize the equilibrium risk premium of this game and the resulting insurance capacity offered. We then compare the pool to a discriminatory auction upon two dimensions, the total capacity insured and the premiums. There is no clear domination of one auction format. Strength of affiliation and competition are key variables.
Cited literature [8 references]
https://hal-univ-pau.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-02439718
Contributor : Anne Perrin Bonraisin <>
Submitted on : Tuesday, January 14, 2020 - 5:11:56 PM
Last modification on : Tuesday, June 22, 2021 - 3:53:10 AM
Long-term archiving on: : Wednesday, April 15, 2020 - 7:04:53 PM
Contributor : Anne Perrin Bonraisin <>
Submitted on : Tuesday, January 14, 2020 - 5:11:56 PM
Last modification on : Tuesday, June 22, 2021 - 3:53:10 AM
Long-term archiving on: : Wednesday, April 15, 2020 - 7:04:53 PM
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afse_ABH-1.pdf
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