Equilibrium with Differential Information and Exogenous Beliefs: A Basic Model of Full Existence

Lionel De Boisdeffre (1, 2)

1 CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne
2 CATT - Centre d'Analyse Théorique et de Traitement des données économiques

We consider a pure exchange economy, where agents, typically asymmetrically informed, exchange securities, on financial markets, and commodities, on spot markets. Consumers have private characteristics, anticipations and beliefs, and no model to forecast prices. They are dispensed with rational expectation and bounded rationality assumptions, such as Radner's (1972, 1979), Kurz' (1994) or Koutsougeras-Yannelis' (1999). We show that they face an incompressible uncertainty, represented by a so-called "minimum uncertainty set". This uncertainty typically adds to the exogenous one, on the state of nature, an 'endogenous uncertainty' over future spot prices. At equilibrium, all agents expect the 'true' price on every spot market as a possible outcome, and elect optimal strategies, ex ante, which clear on all markets, ex post. We show this sequential equilibrium exists whenever agents' prior anticipations embed the minimum uncertainty set. This outcome differs from the standard generic existence results of Hart (1975), Radner (1979), and Duffie-Shaffer (1985), among others, based on the rational expectations of prices.

Keywords: Sequential equilibrium; Temporary equilibrium; Perfect foresight; Existence; Rational expectations; Financial markets; Asymmetric Information; Arbitrage

Domains: Economics and Finance

Lionel De Boisdeffre. Equilibrium with Differential Information and Exogenous Beliefs: A Basic Model of Full Existence. 2018. ⟨hal-02141059⟩