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, Antidumping initiation implies that at least 50% of the domestic industry is not oppose the petition

. Bandyopadhyay, More generally, tariffs determined by lobbying is quite ordinary in trade policy litterature (see for example Mayer, Mitra and Panagariya, 1984.

, For example, US Department of Commerce set high compliance costs described by Murray, 1991.

;. Palmeter and A. Finger, 200-page questionnaires, tight and inflexible deadlines, specific style to report data. Moreover if the foreign firms is partially cooperative then all the informations provided will not be used, 1991.

. Bandyopadhyay, , 2008.

, During the period 1980-1990, the American Department of Trade's use of "facts available" leads to dumping margins that are 38% higher than the average 29% margin. (Baldwin and Moore, 1991) 7 Hansen and Prusa (1996) and Gupta and Panagariya (2006) propose another explanation: the presence of many exporters increases the free-rider problem